Early versions of satellite and radiosonde datasets suggested that the tropical surface had warmed more than the troposphere, while climate models consistently showed tropospheric amplification of surface warming in response to human-caused increases in greenhouse gases. We revisit such comparisons here using new observational estimates of surface and tropospheric temperature changes. We find that there is no longer a serious discrepancy between modeled and observed trends in the tropics. Our results contradict a recent claim that all simulated temperature trends in (...) the tropical troposphere are inconsistent with observations. This claim was based on the use of older radiosonde and satellite datasets and on two methodological errors: the neglect of observational trend uncertainties introduced by interannual climate variability and application of an inappropriate statistical “consistency test”.This emerging reconciliation of models and observations has two primary explanations. First, because of changes in the treatment of buoy and satellite information, new surface temperature datasets yield slightly reduced tropical warming relative to earlier versions. Second, recently developed satellite and radiosonde datasets now show larger warming of the tropical lower troposphere. In the case of a new satellite dataset from remote sensing systems, enhancedRSS warming is due to an improved procedure of adjusting for inter-satellite biases. When the RSS-derived tropospheric temperature trend is compared with four different observed estimates of surface temperature change, the surface warming is invariably amplified in the tropical troposphere, consistent with model results. Even if we use data from a second satellite dataset with smaller tropospheric warming than in remote sensing systems RSS, observed tropical lapse rates are not significantly different from those in all model simulations.Our results contradict a recent claim that all simulated temperature trends in the tropical troposphere and in tropical lapse rates are inconsistent with observations. This claim was based on the use of older radiosonde and satellite datasets and on two methodological errors: the neglect of observational trend uncertainties introduced by interannual climate variability and application of an inappropriate statistical “consistency test”. (shrink)

For over a decade, managed care has profoundly altered how healthcare is delivered in the United States. There have been concerns that the patient-physician relationship may be undermined by various aspects of managed care, such as restrictions on physician choice, productivity requirements that limit the time physicians may spend with patients, and the use of compensation formulas that reward physicians for healthcare dollars not spent. We have previously published data on the effects of managed care on the physician-patient relationship from (...) the physician's perspective. In 1999, we collected data on the impact of managed care arrangements on the physician-patient relationship from the patient's perspective. This article discusses our collective findings. (shrink)

Over the past several years, healthcare has been profoundly altered by the growth of managed care. Because managed care integrates the financing and delivery of healthcare services, it dramatically alters the roles and relationships among providers, payers, and patients. While analysis of this change has focused on whether and how managed care can control costs, an increasingly important concern among healthcare providers and recipients is the impact of managed care on the physicianpatient relationship, but little data have been collected and (...) analyzed. We designed a survey for distribution to Wisconsin physicians to analyze the prevalence and types of managed care arrangements in the state, and the impact of these arrangements on physicians and their relationships with patients. (shrink)

It is shown in the present paper that the transformation relating a parallel transported vector in a Weyl space to the original one is the product of a multiplicative gauge transformation and a proper orthochronous Lorentz transformation. Such a Lorentz transformation admits a spinor representation, which is obtained and used to deduce the transportation properties of a Weyl spinor, which are then expressed in terms of a composite gauge group defined as the product of a multiplicative gauge group and the (...) spinor group. These properties render a spinor amenable to its treatment as a particle coupled to a multidimensional gauge field in the framework of the Kaluza–Klein formulation extended to multidimensional gauge fields. In this framework, a fiber bundle is constructed with a horizontal, base space and a vertical, gauge space, which is a Lie group manifold, termed its structure group. For the present, the base is the Minkowski spacetime and the vertical space is the composite gauge group mentioned above. The fiber bundle is equipped with a Riemannian structure, which is used to obtain the classical description of motion of a spinor. In its classical picture, a Weyl spinor is found to behave as a spinning charged particle in translational motion. The corresponding quantum description is deduced from the Klein–Gordon equation in the Riemann spaces obtained by the methods of path-integration. This equation in the present fiber bundle reduces to the equation for a Weyl spinor, which is close to but differs somewhat from the squared Dirac equation. (shrink)

This complex and subtle book is difficult to summarize. The author intends it as a supplement to existing commentaries on Plato’s Meno, rather than as a straightforward commentary of his own. His approach to Plato builds upon that of Leo Strauss, Jacob Klein, and the Tübingen School, but is not reducible to any of these and contains other influences as well, such as Heidegger. In addition to taking with minute seriousness the dramatic composition of the dialogue, Brague combines precise (...) and sensitive philological tools with a marked ontological interest. He reads the Platonic dialogue in a bipolar perspective. Dialogues are tests of friendship but at the same time, as "works" or literary texts rather than objects, they may have a sense in themselves. Brague cites Proust in this context, but one thinks also of Derrida. Consequently the dialogue has both an intrinsic order, corresponding to the rhythmic development of its theme, and also an allusive dimension or a lacuna suggested by the text, to be filled in by the reader. In a similar sense one may say that the theme of the Meno is bipolar. The first pole is the theme of the nature of the soul, hence of virtue, and more specifically, of Meno’s soul. Meno’s defective nature is the basis for a continuous "degradation" in the stages of the dialogue. Alternatively, it is the basis for Meno’s "anthropological" approach to virtue. The key to the Meno is that the Good is missing from the dialogue. This observation provides a transition to the second thematic pole. The structure of the dialogue reflects the stages of Plato’s esoteric teaching as presented by K. Gaiser : dialectic, geometry, politics. This raises a question for Brague, which he does not seem to me to answer : if this is the order of Plato’s secret system, how is the degraded presentation of the system, relative to Meno’s defective soul, isomorphic to the hierarchical structure of the system? Granting that politics is lower than dialectic, there must be a better and a worse presentation of politics. Brague’s approach entails that the degraded image of the structure nevertheless reveals the structure itself. But if the Good is absent from the image, how are we to infer that it is present in the structure? A similar problem suggests itself with respect to what Brague calls the key to the movement of the dialogue: the distinction between the limiting and the limited and correspondingly, "the powerlessness of the limit" in Meno’s case. In the last and longest section of the book, there are many fine analyses and illuminating insights, too many to do justice to here. One may call special attention to the connection between the episode of recollection and geometry on the one hand, and the duality of principles in Plato’s system. I also found unusually helpful Brague’s exposition of the "feminine" nature of Plato’s teaching of genesis, of the link between Plato’s use of anakineisthai and the dramatic device of a prologue, and the significance of katasëmainesthai in conjunction with the theme of "growing" and preserving virtuous youths. In sum: this is a book to be read carefully and slowly by every serious student of Plato. It is almost as difficult, and hence as controversial, as a Platonic dialogue. It is marked throughout, even when influenced by contemporary schools of thought, by a genuine interest in Plato’s manner of thinking and writing. This is not exactly a common property of contemporary books on Plato.—S.R. (shrink)

This article discusses the impact of Descartes’s substance-dualism on his account of discursive reason. Taking the presentation of deduction in the Rules as a paradigmatic case of thought’s extension and movement in time, I analyze the relation between intuitive and discursive understanding and that between intellect and imagination. I focus specifically on the mediation of corporeal impressions and of intellectual ideas by ingenium. As intellectual, ingenium is a faculty of understanding; as joining with phantasia, ingenium has access to corporeal affections, (...) images, and memory. Deduction involves both of these aspects of ingenium, and Descartes’s dualism complicates efforts to clarify the operations and nature of ingenium. Thus the dynamics of dualistic psychology account for some of the limitations of deduction in particular and discursive rationality in general. (shrink)

The responses to the questions of why? when?, how?, where?, and in what ways? business ethics should be taught in the BusinessEthics classroom inundate the scholarly literature. Yet, to date, despite some very interesting ideas, with respect to the answers givento the above question, not only has nothing even close to consensus been reached, but this particular area of pedagogy is instagnation—authors still challenge both the very idea of teaching business ethics as well as the practical value of such courses (...) for ourstudents once they graduate to the corporate world.In this paper I will suggest that the reason for this lack of pedagogical progress is that there has been a serious oversight regarding the most important teaching question of all: Who? I will show that the pedagogical issue of whom should be teaching Business Ethics has been largely ignored, skirted or answered incorrectly. I will then boldly argue that the only necessary condition for successful courses inBusiness Ethics is that they be taught by experts in ethics, i.e., Ph.D.s in philosophy. (shrink)

Spinoza is often conceived as a highly intellectualist philosopher, and it is tempting to read human freedom without attention to its material basis. In this paper, I study Spinoza's claim that the more the body can undergo, the more the mind can know in order to establish Spinoza's view of freedom under the attribute of extension.

Recent discussions have often associated the theme of political transformation in Spinoza with the phenomenon of revolution, which he analyzes as sometimes inevitable but generally undesirable. In this paper, I look more broadly at the theme of change in Spinoza’s political philosophy and focus the way he conceptualizes political formation as occurring in medias res. From this standpoint, there are isolated or pre-political individuals, and politics is subsumed within nature. Human beings always exist amidst other human beings and are always-already (...) interacting with them, thereby generating order. Thus would-be founders and sovereigns act in always-already formed situations; they are artisans, working with concrete actualities, namely, human beings already shaped in causal environments or networks and producing effects, not creators absolutely de novo. Nor is there some a- or post-political phase of life. The upshot is that Spinozan politics concerns only better and worse orders, not the existence per se of civic order. I explore Spinoza’s emphasis on the affective basis of politics in light of his account of the causal complexity of imagination and its affects, and I consider the ways the art of politics is concerned with managing and shaping imagination in accord with what reason counsel. (shrink)

This admirable volume treats the period from Montaigne to Kant. As the editor, Donald Rutherford, promises in his Introduction, the volume reflects the broadly contextualist consensus among scholars in the field over the last few decades. Neither intellectual history nor abstract conceptual analysis, contextualist scholarship looks at the way philosophical ideas develop in concrete settings, within intellectual horizons, and in response to specific philosophical problems. Thus this Cambridge Companion is committed to the idea that a philosopher’s published works must be (...) read in connection with both his or her correspondences, drafts, and other papers, as well as in connection with the thinkers whose works constitute that philosopher’s intellectual environment and matrix. Simply put, contextualist historians of philosophy deny that philosophical work takes place in a conceptual or historical vacuum. Second, this collection reflects the expanding list of important thinkers, works, and issues in the period. The familiar authors Rutherford terms the “canonical seven” —Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz for the “rationalists” and Locke, Berkeley, Hume for the “empiricists,” all. (shrink)

In Ethics 4, Spinoza argues that “A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation on life, not on death” (E4p67). Spinoza’s argument for this claim depends on his view of imagination, reason, and scientia intuitiva and on his notion of conatus. I explicate Spinoza’s view of life in terms of power (potentia) and show that Spinozan death amounts to reconfiguration rather than absolute annihilation. I then show that E4p67 reflects Spinoza’s well-known account (...) of the three kinds of knowing. Thinking of death is quintessentially imaginative and passive. The free person of E4p67 is in contrast a rational person. To reason, and as becomes especially clear E5, to experience scientia intuitiva, moreover is to think of things “without any relation to time, but [rather] sub specie aeternatitis”(E2p44c2) and to experience activity To the extent, then, that we are rational, free, and active, death is a non-issue. Indeed, to the extent that we are able to meditate on life sub specie aeternitatis, we actually experience joy, love (E5p20s, p32c), eternity (Sp23s), and “the greatest satisfaction of the Mind” (E5p27). (shrink)

In an effort to assess the latest thinking in the Roman Catholic Church on economic matters, we examine the newest encyclical by Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate (Charity in Truth) for guidance concerning marketing and business strategy. Core ethical values, consistent with historical Catholic Social Teachings (CST), are retained. However, some important nuances are added to previous treatments, and, reflecting the mind of the current Pontiff, certain points of emphasis are shifted to account for recent global developments. Key areas (...) of consistency and differences (as we perceive them) are spelled out along with some brief commentary on the evolution of the CST position on matters of importance to business decision makers. We close our analysis with a brief discussion of how the lessons of the encyclical can be applied to selected marketing problems embedded with ethical issues, including some criteria for evaluating marketing programs. Finally, we note some editorial commentary published in the wake of the letter’s release along with our own summation. (shrink)

Neural engineering technologies such as implanted deep brain stimulators and brain-computer interfaces represent exciting and potentially transformative tools for improving human health and well-being. Yet their current use and future prospects raise a variety of ethical and philosophical concerns. Devices that alter brain function invite us to think deeply about a range of ethical concerns—identity, normality, authority, responsibility, privacy, and justice. If a device is stimulating my brain while I decide upon an action, am I still the author of the (...) action? Does a device make the interiority of my experience accessible to others? Will the device change the way I think of myself and others think of me? Such fundamental questions arise even when a device is designed for only a relatively circumscribed purpose, such as restoring functioning via a smart prosthetic. We are part of a National Science Foundation-funded Engineering Research Center tasked with investigating philosophical and social implications of neural engineering research and technologies. Neural devices already in clinical use, such as deep brain stimulators for Parkinson's disease or essential tremor, have spurred healthy debate about such implications. Devices currently under development—such as the BrainGate System of implanted brain sensors coupled to robotics in persons with paralysis, exoskeletons for augmented movement, transcranial do-it-yourself stimulators, closed-loop brain stimulating systems, or even brain-to-brain interfacing—promise to extend and deepen these debates. At our center, brain-computer interfaces are the principal focus of work. Even acknowledging that the clinical translation of neural devices and seamless integration by end users may still largely reside in the future, the potential these devices hold calls for careful early analysis. The launching of the Brain Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies Initiative in April 2013 provides further impetus for this work. (shrink)

This chapter considers evidence from Spinoza’s Ethics, Theologico-Political Treatise, and correspondence to clarify his account of philosophical pedagogy and his analysis of the shift from imagining, characterized by inadequate ideas and passive affects, to reasoning and intuitive understanding, which consist of adequate ideas and active affects. Central issues in Spinoza’s account of how to make a philosopher include the tasks of teachers, the cultivation of the desire to learn, and the doctrine of the common notions. The chapter reads the Ethics (...) as a theoretical, systematic account of human development and philosophical education and as a practical, pedagogical intervention designed to transform the reader. It looks to Spinoza’s presentation of Christ as intellectual knower and teacher par excellence in the Theologico-Political Treatise and to parallels there with the Ethics. Both Christ and Spinoza himself employ “common and true notions” for philosophical teaching. (shrink)

Drug companies are moving their research from academic medical centers to physicians’ private offices. The shift brings in more subjects, and could mean faster and better results. It also changes the physician's relationship to patients, dangles monetary lures in front of physicians, and could produce subjects who don't understand what they're participating in and results that are unreliable.

In proposition 7 of the second part of the Ethics, Spinoza famously contends that the “order and connection of things is the same as the order and connection of ideas.” On this basis, Spinoza argues in the scholium that thought and extension are different ways of conceiving one and the same substance: “the thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute, now under that”. Less famously, in the same scholium, (...) Spinoza insists that the relation of thought and extension is not the only issue at stake. He notes that “certain Hebrews” saw, “as if through a cloud,” the unity of God and the world in knowing: “they maintained that God, God’s intellect, and the things understood by him are one and the same.” The cloud is the idea of divine transcendence. Commenting on this passage, Aviezer Ravitzky has observed that Spinoza’s mention of these “certain Hebrews” should inform us about “an inherent problem, about dynamite concealed in the teachings of the Jewish Aristotelians such as Maimonides.” If, as Aristotle argues in the De Anima and Metaphysics, the knower and the known are one in knowing, then the distinction between God and the objects of God’s knowing is undermined. Noetic union is ontological union, for the intellect is its ideas. Thus Aristotelian noesis undermines divine transcendence. E2p7 and its scholium, then, presage the most famous—or infamous—expression of the Ethics, Deus sive Natura. Maimonides qualifies his Aristotelianism with an hierarchical emanationist cosmology, thereby avoiding the implications of noetic union by differentiating between the creator and the creatures and between the agent intellect, the lowest of the celestial spheres and source of the human acquired intellect, and the divine intellect. Gersonides, the fourteenth century giant of the medieval Jewish tradition and its most consistent Aristotelian, endorses the Aristotelian formula, arguing consistently that the intelligible is an intellect and offering a meticulous explanation of “why it is said of non-material things that the intellect, the thinker, and the intelligible are all one.” In this article, I argue that Gersonides’ own highly Averroian position is evoked in E2p7s and that Spinoza extends and radicalizes the Gersonidean inheritance. Beginning from E2p7 and its scholium, I explore the implications of noetic union for the relationship of God and the world and that between thought and extension. (shrink)

The Ethics of Joy offers reconstructive argument, careful engagement with select literature, and a big-picture presentation of Spinoza’s view of the well-lived human life. Not “convinced that Kantians in ethics are Kantians because of an argument that Kant or Korsgaard makes,” Andrew Youpa urges us to consider Spinoza’s view as “an alternative way of thinking about our lives—an alternative that is illuminating and insightful”. Since “the presentation of an illuminating alternative is arguably the best a philosopher can do”, this is (...) no small task. Youpa argues that Spinozan virtue—human excellence—is defined by our power to care for ourselves and others, not by our accountability. On his reading, power, and... (shrink)

Considered in its seventeenth-century context, Spinoza’s way of thinking about substance and nature is striking for its simultaneous refusal of Cartesian dualism and Hobbesian materialism. Spinoza knew both thinkers’ work well, yet sided with neither. Where Descartes divides substance into thinking and extended substance, and where Hobbes reduces all things to body, Spinoza espouses what is best called a double-aspect or non-reductive monism. The single substance of the Ethics is expressed as an infinity of modes in an infinity of attributes, (...) each infinite in kind. Thought and extension are two of the infinite attributes of substance, and the simultaneous sameness and difference of thought and extension constitutes a major theme of the Ethics. Using exactly parallel demonstrations, Spinoza argues in the second part of the Ethics that substance, or God, or nature is equally a thinking thing and an extended thing. Descartes’ account of matter and extension, in which passive matter is set in motion by God, inspires harsh criticism from Spinoza. (shrink)

Through a close analysis of texts from the Second Objections and Replies to the Meditations, this article addresses the tension between the pursuit of certainty and the preservation of divine transcendence in Descartes’s philosophy. Via a hypothetical “atheist geometer,” the Objectors charge Descartes with pantheism. While the Objectors’ motivations are not clear, the objection raises provocative questions about the relation of the divine and the human mind and about the being of created or dependent entities inDescartes’s metaphysics. Descartes contends that (...) there are real, eternal essences present in the human intellect as innate ideas. I argue that this claim implicates him in pantheism, not merely univocity. In the course of the analysis, I consider recent interpretations by Wells, Marion, and Hatfield. (shrink)

"Dreaming with open eyes" is a tagline for Spinoza's critique of Descartes; the dreams in question are principally those of volition and the active imagination. In this article, I compare the Cartesian theory of imagination as an active, but not fully rational, power of the mind and the Cartesian account of the volitional self to Spinoza's views. Descartes's own dreams and theories of dreaming are the focus of the first part of the article. Thereafter I examine Spinoza's critique of Descartes (...) and his alternative account of imagination. Finally, I argue that there is a positive sense of dreaming with open eyes to be recuperated in Spinoza's thought. Construed positively, to dream with open eyes is to understand dreams and imagination as natural phenomena and so to be able to respond constructively to them in ethical and political, as well as epistemological, life. (shrink)

There has been much discussion concerning the consequences of 'going natural', i.e., of replacing a priori epistemology with empirical psychology. Traditionalists claim that a naturalized epistemology is not viable—to eliminate the normative from an account of knowledge is to cease to do epistemology at all. Naturalists claim that a naturalized account is the only viable one—assuming, in step with the urgings of Quine, that there are no standards independent of (and external to) science, science itself must act as the sole (...) epistemic norm. In the wake of the above debate some epistemologists have attempted to argue in favor of, and develop, a middle-ground position— normative naturalism . Such a position is intended to be consistent with the naturalist's intuition that the traditional search for a 'first philosophy'is misguided and consistent with the traditionalist's intuition that a complete elimination of the normative would leave epistemology impotent. In this paper I will examine one argument in favor of a normative naturalism . / will show that such a proposal is inherently problematic and argue that naturalism and normativity are mutually exclusive concepts. Therefore, I suggest that, even in the 'age of cognitive science', epistemologists continue to do traditional epistemology by attempting to develop, a priori , the general criteria for determining the justificatory status of our (scientific) beliefs. (shrink)

Terrorism, international gangs, and other frequently mentioned national security threats are actually less dangerous than a new type of state-corporate crime that may be called national insecurity crime. This crime poses not only unprecedented victimization, but a massive ethical problem. Examples in the U.S. include the 1980s Savings and Loan (S&L) scandal, the late-1990s dot-com bubble, the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, and the 2007–09 financial crisis. National insecurity crime threatens national security because of its geographic and social extensiveness, severity (...) of harm, dynamism, and unpredictability. It endangers the political, economic, social, and environmental security of most or all of the U.S. population. This endangerment includes increasing the risks of loss, suffering, and destruction on a large scale. This article offers a starting point for a sociological criminology of national insecurity crime. National insecurity crime involves large-scale cooperation that relies on often indirect or mediated interaction between perpetrating persons, groups, and organizations. It also involves widespread social harm for private gain, and yet, due to ideology and social construction, it tends to be hidden in plain sight. (shrink)

Alvin Plantinga declared in 1983 that Classical Foundationalism had collapsed. He was convinced that he had found an utterly damaging argument against CF: CF is self-referentially incoherent. Already Alston (1985) and Quinn (1985 and 1993) and recently DePoe (2007) have denied that Plantinga’s argument is successful. There are three objections against his argument:i) He has to show that there is no argument for CF; ii) there may be an inductive argument for CF; iii) there are other good arguments for CF, (...) presented e.g. by Richard Fumerton. In this paper I will argue that i) is wrong and that Quinn’s inductive argument (ii) fails. Plantinga has shown that the “old” type of CF is self-refuting. Plantinga’s argument is not successful if aimed against a contemporary Fumerton-style CF because this type of CF differs in at least one relevant aspect from the kind of CF Plantinga was struggling with. (shrink)

Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) helps researchers understand how cognitive skills and strategies make it possible for people to act effectively and get things done. CTA can yield information people needemployers faced with personnel issues, market researchers who want to understand the thought processes of consumers, trainers and others who design instructional systems, health care professionals who want to apply lessons learned from errors and accidents, systems analysts developing user specifications, and many other professionals. CTA can show what makes the workplace (...) workand what keeps it from working as well as it might.Working Minds is a true handbook, offering a set of tools for doing CTA: methods for collecting data about cognitive processes and events, analyzing them, and communicating them effectively. It covers both the "why" and the "how" of CTA methods, providing examples, guidance, and stories from the authors' own experiences as CTA practitioners. Because effective use of CTA depends on some conceptual grounding in cognitive theory and researchon knowing what a cognitive perspective can offerthe book also offers an overview of current research on cognition.The book provides detailed guidance for planning and carrying out CTA, with chapters on capturing knowledge and capturing the way people reason. It discusses studying cognition in real-world settings and the challenges of rapidly changing technology. And it describes key issues in applying CTA findings in a variety of fields. Working Minds makes the methodology of CTA accessible and the skills involved attainable. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Mogens Lærke. Spinoza and the Freedom of Philosophizing. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. xviii + 387. Hardback, $115.00. -/- Spinoza's political philosophy, always a subject of attention in Francophone scholarship, has been coming into sharper focus for Anglophone readers in recent years as well. Mogens Lærke—well known for his essays on metaphysics and cognition in Spinoza, for his invaluable book Leibniz lecteur de Spinoza (Paris: Honoré Champion, (...) 2008), and for bridging French and English scholarly communities—has now written a richly contextual treatment of Spinoza's conception of the freedom of philosophizing (libertas philosophandi). His book presents a thoroughly mid- to late seventeenth-century Dutch Spinoza. The expression libertas philosophandi appears in the full title of Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise (1670, hereafter TTP). Lærke argues that libertas philosophandi is the key to understanding "Spinoza's attempt to theorize a new republican public sphere" (5). As defined by Spinoza, "the freedom of philosophizing is not for Spinoza an individual right but a collective natural authority constitutive of a particular kind of public sphere" (5)—namely, one constituted by such recognizably republican notions as equality, integrity, virtue, and honor. It depends on citizens "having taken possession of their own free judgment and on their capability and willingness to engage with each other without prejudice and deceit" (234). Far from being "granted," libertas philosophandi is "achieved through civic education and mutual advising in the public sphere" (235). Rather than a formal permission or abstract right, libertas philosophandi is a socially mediated expression of power (or what the Ethics calls conatus, striving and expression): it emerges and is maintained through cultivation, regulation, and identification, and is communal—that is, political. Put another way, libertas philosophandi is a collective form of freedom enacted as a noncoercive exchange of views among equals who agree to search for truth and pursue well-being together. As distinct from the rational and intellectual freedom examined in the Ethics, libertas philosophandi reflects everyone's natural (and so inevitable) power of self-expression and does not depend on rational attainment. The task of politics is inducing as many people as possible to express themselves constructively. Thus, politics depends on motivating people to act as if they were rational. In practice, this means that citizens must commit themselves to friendly mutual advice and teaching rather than to coercive measures, to deliberative structures rather than to secrecy and partiality, and to acceptance of a unified sovereign, whatever the exact form of the government may be. Following the indications of TTP 5 and TTP 16-17, Lærke shows that this commitment can come about either imaginatively [End Page 523] or rationally. For those who do not or cannot—or cannot consistently—comprehend the usefulness of a well-constructed imperium, imaginative myths, such as the revelation at Mount Sinai or the social contract itself, are required. For those for whom the founding myths and codes, such as the principles of universal religion, prove insufficiently binding, state force intervenes. With characteristic erudition, Lærke situates Spinoza in the political, religious, sociocultural, and economic currents of mid- to late seventeenth-century Amsterdam. This contextualization leads to new ways of understanding Spinoza's place in the history of toleration and democratic thought. Lærke pairs this historical-philosophical sleuthing with close attention to Spinoza's exact language and argumentative structure. Most provocatively, Lærke insists on the fundamental continuity of Spinoza's political philosophy against influential readings that suppose a late-life change of heart. Chapters 2–5 explore the meaning of libertas philosophandi. Chapter 2, "Circles and Spheres of Free Philosophizing," retraces the history of the notion; chapter 3, "Philosophizing," presents philosophizing as a broad argumentative style encompassing reasoning from experience and practical or historical reasoning as well as more technical modes of inference and argument. What Spinoza calls the "natural light" and characterizes as "sound reason" is thus common to all, not restricted to intellectuals. Chapter 4, "The Apostolic Styles," studies Spinoza's analysis of the teaching methods exhibited in the Greek Scriptures. Chapter 5, "Authority," draws this part of the book to a... (shrink)

In her re-analysis of the evidence presented in Klein and Nichols (2012) to support their argument that patient R.B. temporarily lost possessory custody of consciously apprehended objects (in this case, objects that normally would be non-inferentially taken as episodic memory), Professor Roache concludes Klein and Nichols's claims are untenable. I argue that Professor Roache is incorrect in her re-interpretation, and that this is due, in part, to lack of sufficient familiarity with psychological theory on memory as well as (...) clinical literature on felt loss of ownership of one’s intentional objects. (shrink)

A reprint of the 1951 translation of Kleines Lehrbuch des Positivismus, this work presents the positivist's view of the world for the layman, but introduces a few interesting variations on standard positivist positions. More space than is usual in similar books is devoted to a discussion of the social sciences, art, law, morality, and religion.--R. G. S.

At the 1969 annual meeting of the American Association for the Ad vancement ofScience, held in Boston on December 27-29, a sequence of symposia on the philosophical foundations of science was organized jointly by Section L of the Association and the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science. Section L is devoted to the history, philos ophy, logic and sociology of science, with broad connotations extended both to 'science' and to 'philosophy'. With collaboration generously extended by other and more specialized (...) Sections of the AAAS, the Section L program took an unusually rich range of topics, and indeed the audiences were large, and the discussions lively. This book, regrettably delayed in publication, contains the major papers from those symposia of 1969. In addition, it contains the distin guished George Sarton Memorial Lecture of that meeting, 'Boltzmann, Monocycles and Mechanical Explanation' by Martin J. Klein. Some additions and omissions should be noted: In Part 1, dedicated to the 450th anniversary of the birth of Leonardo da Vinci, we have been una bie to include a contrihution by Elmer Belt who was prevented by storms from participating. In Part II, on physics and the explanation of life, we were unable to persuade Isaac Asimov to overcome his modesty about the historical remarks he made under the title 'Arrhenius Revisited'. (shrink)

Diese Arbeit, die das Thema der Sklaverei im Werk der großen Kappadokier behandelt, leistet einen Beitrag zu der heute immer mehr an Bedeutung gewinnenden Sozialgeschichte der Spätantike. Die besondere Leistung dieser Arbeit liegt in der sorgfältigen minutiösen Sammlung aller Belege zum Thema Sklaverei, die der Vf. unter Zuhilfenahme elektronischer Mittel (nach Angaben des Vf.s u.a. des TLG) gesucht und in ihrem von ihm erfolgreich rekonstruierten geschichtlichen Hintergrund interpretiert hat. Lob verdient die Arbeit ferner wegen ihrer überschaubaren, klaren Gliederung, durch welche (...) der Leser auf den ersten Blick die Ansichten der drei Kappadokier nachvollziehen und miteinander vergleichen kann. (shrink)

Topology change is discussed as a barrier penetration process and illustrated by explicit calculations in Witten's Kaluza-Klein bubble geometry. Initial values are given for other bubble geometries, including ones with negative total mass.

For many years scholars have paid lip service to the "dramatic" or "mimetic" character of Plato's dialogues, but too few have taken this character seriously. Klein does, making it the basis of his exposition. He convincingly demonstrates that the dramatic action and the topic discussed are tightly interwoven and must be taken together to understand the Meno. In his introduction he distinguishes three kinds of mimesis: ethological, doxological, and mythological. The Meno is interpreted as primarily ethological. But one can (...) ask whether the author has done justice to the doxological element in the dialogue. He places considerable emphasis on the character of the "historical" Meno and does not seem to consider seriously the possibility that Meno's responses to Socrates show that he is learning something about the nature of ἀρετή. To suggest a possible criticism is in no way to take issue with the major thesis of this thorough and imaginative study.—R. J. W. (shrink)

On Zermelo's view, any mathematical theory presupposes a non-empty domain, the elements of which enjoy equal status; furthermore, mathematical axioms must be chosen from among those propositions that reflect the equal status of domain elements. As for which propositions manage to do this, Zermelo's answer is, those that are ?symmetric?, meaning ?invariant under domain permutations?. We argue that symmetry constitutes Zermelo's conceptual analysis of ?general proposition?. Further, although others are commonly associated with the extension of Klein's Erlanger Programme to (...) logic, Zermelo's name has a place in that story. (shrink)

Robert Lassalle-Klein’s paper has provided an examination of how Ignatio Ellacuría, working with philosopher Xavier Zubiri, both used and criticized some of Karl Rahner’s key ideas for the purpose of finding a philosophical framework for working out Ellacuría’s own theological vision, rooted in his experiences as a Spanish Jesuit serving in Latin America. While the technical work in this adaptation receives some commentary here, most of my remarks are observations about the impact of this work on Rahner scholarship more (...) generally. Ellacuría’s use of Rahner is in marked contrast to Metz’s critique that saw Rahner’s transcendental method incapable of dealing with historical realities. Ellacuría’s work can be understood as supplying a particularity to Rahner’s austere structures that, I argue, is intrinsic to those structures. As such, Ellacuría’s work should be adopted into the canon of mainstream Rahner scholarship. (shrink)